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NOTES
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES AND THE
IMPLICATIONS OF CONSENSUAL
REFERENCES
I. Introduction
The office of United States Magistrate was created in 1968, by
Congressional enactment of the Federal Magistrates Act,' in an at-
tempt to alleviate problems of delay and congestion caused by a
substantial increase in the volume of litigation in the federal courts.'
These magistrates were given jurisdiction over certain minor crimi-
nal offenses and could be assigned additional duties by individual
district court rules.'
The legislative history of the Magistrates Act indicates that Con-
gress intended the office of magistrate to be a responsible and presti-
gious one, thus enabling it to shoulder a part of the judicial burden.4
However, the exact scope of the magistrate's responsibilities, as well
as the related issue of the scope of the district court's review of a
1. Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, § 101, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968) (codified at
28 U.S.C. §§ 631-39 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 111, 1973)).
2. United States v. Eastmount Shipping Corp., 62 F.R.D. 437, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973).
4. This Congressional intent is illustrated by reference to the Senate Report concerning
the Federal Magistrates Act:
S.945 is designed to create an upgraded lower tier judicial office that will be free from
the present defects of the U.S. commissioner system, and that will be a truly useful
component of our Federal judiciary. By raising the standards of the lowest judicial
office by making the position more attractive to highly qualified individuals, and by
increasing the scope of the responsibilities that can be discharged by that office, your
committee hopes to establish a system capable of increasing the overall efficiency of
the Federal judiciary by relieving the district courts of some of their minor burdens,
while at the same time providing a higher standard of justice at the point where many
individuals first come into contact with the courts.
S. REP. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1967). And, in discussing the "additional duties"
to which magistrates may be assigned the Report stated:
If district judges are willing to experiment with the assignment to magistrates of other
functions in aid of the business of the courts, your committee believes that there will
be increased time available to judges for the careful and unhurried performance of their
vital and traditional adjudicatory duties, and a consequent benefit to both efficiency
and the quality of justice in the Federal courts.
Id. at 26.
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magistrate's actions, remains uncertain.' It is clear both from the
wording of the statute and from the legislative history that the
legislature did not intend to limit magistrates' functions to those
listed in the Act.'
The significance of the magistrate in the efficient operation of the
federal court system makes it important to analyze the extent of the
magistrate's powers as well as the limitations placed thereon. This
note will examine the matters which may properly be referred to a
magistrate and the standard of review which is used when the mag-
istrate's decision goes before the district court. A major considera-
tion in this discussion will be whether parties, by their consent, can
expand the scope of magistrate's powers.
II. Powers of the Magistrate
The Magistrates Act specifically delineates certain
administrative-type powers, such as administering oaths and affir-
mations, which a magistrate possesses.7 It also provides that under
district court rules a magistrate may be assigned "such additional
duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States."I These duties, according to the statute,9 include but
5. See DeCosta v. CBS, Inc., 520 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1975); United States v. Eastmount
Shipping Corp., 62 F.R.D. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1970) states that a magistrate may be assigned additional duties
authorized by district court rules and merely by way of examples adds: "The additional
duties authorized by rule may include, but are not restricted to . . . ." (emphasis added).
The remarks of Senator Tydings, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Improvement in
Judicial Machinery and major sponsor of the Act, are also worthy of note in this regard: "The
Magistrate Act specifies these three areas [28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(I)-(3) (1970)] because they
came up in our hearings and we thought they were areas in which the district courts might
be able to benefit from the magistrate's services. We did not limit the courts to the areas
mentioned." Hearings on S. 945 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 17, at 81 (1968).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a): "Each United States magistrate serving under this chapter shall
have within the territorial jurisdiction prescribed by his appointment-(2) the power to
administer oaths and affirmations, impose conditions of release under § 3146 of title 18, and
take acknowledgments, affidavits, and depositions .
8. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1970) provides:
Any district court of the United States, by the concurrence of a majority of all the
judges of such district court, may establish rules pursuant to which any full-time
United States magistrate, or, where there is no full-time magistrate reasonably avail-
able, any part-time magistrate specially designated by the court, may be assigned
within the territorial jurisdiction of such court such additional duties as are not incon-
sistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. The additional duties
authorized by rule may include, but are not restricted to-
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are not limited to: service as a special master pursuant to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure;'" assistance in civil and criminal
pretrial and discovery proceedings;" and preliminary review of ha-
beas corpus petitions." A question of interpretation arises with re-
spect to the range of these three particular duties as well as the
latitude to be allowed generally under the guise of "additional du-
ties."' 3 These are but two aspects of the same problem-the permis-
sible scope of references to a magistrate.
Two leading cases dealing with the problem are TPO, Inc. v.
McMillen'4 and Wingo v. Wedding.'5 Although both opinions repre-
sent restraints on a magistrate's activities, they have been limited
to their facts.'" In TPO the court of appeals ruled that magistrates
do not have power to decide motions to dismiss or motions for sum-
mary judgment since both involve ultimate decision making which
district courts cannot delegate to magistrates." In so holding, the
court said that reference to a magistrate in such a situation
"amounted to little less than an abdication of the judicial function
depriving the parties of a trial before the court on the basic issues
(1) service as a special master in an appropriate civil action, pursuant to the applicable
provisions of this title and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States
district courts;
(2) assistance to a district judge in the conduct of pretrial or discovery proceedings in
civil or criminal actions; and
(3) preliminary review of applications for posttrial relief made by individuals con-
victed of criminal offenses, and submission of a report and recommendations to facili-
tate the decision of the district judge having jurisdiction over the case as to whether
there should be a hearing.
9. Id.
10. See generally Note, Masters and Magistrates in the Federal Courts, 88 HARv. L. REv.
779 (1975). FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b) provides: "A reference to a master shall be the exception
and not the rule. In actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when the
issues are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of account and
of difficult computation of damages, a reference shall be made only upon a showing that some
exceptional condition requires it."
11. For a personal account of the role of the United States magistrate in pre-trial proceed-
ings, see Naythons, The Civil Settlement Conference, 9 FORUM 75 (1973).
12. See generally Note, The Validity of United States Magistrates' Criminal Jurisdiction,
60 VA. L. REv. 697 (1974).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1970).
14. 460 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1972).
15. 418 U.S. 461 (1974).
16. Campbell v. United States Dist. Ct., 501 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 879 (1974). See text accompanying notes 34-36, 45-47 infra.
17. 460 F.2d at 359.
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involved in the litigation."'"
The TPO court stressed that the legislative history of the Magis-
trates Act demonstrated that the functions to be assigned to magis-
trates should be limited to those which could be handled by a non-
Article III judge.19 The TPO court also pointed to a definite legis-
lative intent to so curb magistrates' powers by comparing the ori-
ginal statutory wording of the "additional duties" that might be
assigned to a magistrate with the final formulation which is de-
signed to maintain the magistrate's role as an advisory one. 0 Thus,
18. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256 (1957), quoted in 460 F.2d at 359.
19. " '[Ilt contemplates assignments to magistrates under circumstances where the ulti-
mate decision of the case is reserved to the judge, except in those instances where action can
properly be taken by a nonarticle Ill judge' ". 460 F.2d at 358, quoting S. REP. No. 371, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 25-27 (1967). U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1 provides: "The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and
inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times,
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Contin-
uance in Office." Cases and controversies in any of the nine enumerated areas in Article III
can be adjudicated at the federal level only by Article III courts exercising the judicial power
of the United States. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 544 (1962); Williams v. United
States, 289 U.S. 553, 578 (1933). Courts have recognized that there are three general catego-
ries in which cases may be decided by non-Article III courts because they do not involve the
exercise of Article III defined judicial power. These categories are: territorial courts and local
District of Columbia courts; matters which are not considered to be inherently judicial; and
specific subject matter areas such as taxation and military discipline. Note, supra note 10,
at 781-82. References by an Article III district court judge of matters properly before that
court cannot fit into any of those categories. However, determination of facts by non-Article
III officials aiding Article III judges is constitutionally permissible.
In Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) the Supreme Court held that "there is no require-
ment that, in order to maintain the essential attributes of the judicial power, all determina-
tions of fact in constitutional courts shall be made by judges" id. at 51, and that "the
reservation of full authority to the court to deal with matters of law provides for the appropri-
ate exercise of the judicial function .... " Id. at 54. This reasoning can be extended to
conclude that magistrates may constitutionally assist district court judges subject to the
proviso found in TPO that the judge be the final decision maker. For a detailed discussion of
the question of Article III courts and the constitutionality of references to magistrates, see
Note, supra note 10.
The TPO court noted that the report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary mentioned
the safeguards which existed to prevent an abdication of its judicial function by the district
court: first, that assignments to magistrates under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) were to be governed
by district court rule and not by individual judges; and second, that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)
prohibited assignments inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.
With these provisions, the Committee felt that any delegation of responsibility to a magis-
trate would be within the constitutionally permissible duties of a non-Article III judicial
officer. 460 F. 2d at 357.
20. 460 F.2d at 357.
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TPO stands for the proposition that references can be made to a
magistrate under the Magistrates Act only when such a reference
will not remove the ultimate decision making function from the
judge.2
The Supreme Court in Wingo v. Wedding22 also limited the power
of a magistrate by holding that that part of a district court rule
authorizing a magistrate to hold evidentiary hearings in federal ha-
beas corpus cases was invalid.2" The Court concluded that 28 U.S.C.
§ 2243, a section of the habeas corpus statute, requires the district
judge to conduct such evidentiary hearings personally. 4 Thus, the
local rule authorizing a magistrate to do so is "inconsistent with the
. . .laws of the United States."25 In addition, the Court concluded
that the language of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) precluded magistrates
from this assignment by calling for the magistrate to make only a
preliminary review and recommendation regarding the need for a
posttrial hearing. 6 The Court pointed out that the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States27 refused to approve the wording of the
subsection until it clearly indicated that magistrates could not be
given the responsibility of holding evidentiary hearings on applica-
tions for posttrial relief.2"
The changes in the three categories of "additional duties" were drastic: (1) "service
as a special master" was expressly made subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
which include the highly restrictive Rule 53; (2) "supervision of the conduct" of
pretrial or discovery proceedings was reduced to "assistance to a district judge"; and
(3) "preliminary consideration of application for posttrial relief' was reduced to "pre-
liminary review" leading to "submission of a report and recommendation to facilitate
the decision of the district judge" as to "whether there should be a hearing."
Id.
21. See generally Doyle, Implementing The Federal Magistrates Act, 39 J. KAN. B.A. 25,
29 (1970).
22. 418 U.S. 461 (1974).
23. Id. at 472.
24. Id. at 477-78. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1970) is given the construction given to its predecessor
statute, Rev. Stat. § 631, 18 Stat. 143 (1873), in Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342 (1941).
See also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
25. 418 U.S. at 472.
26. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1970) provides that additional duties may include "prelimi-
nary review of applications for posttrial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal
offenses, and submission of a report and recommendations to facilitate the decision of the
district judge having jurisdiction over the case as to whether there should be a hearing."
27. The Judicial Conference of the United States was established pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 331 (1970). It is provided that the conference "shall make a comprehensive survey of the
condition of business in the courts .. "and also that the conference "carry on a continuous
study of the operation and effect of the general rules of practice and procedure. "Id.
28. 418 U.S. at 470.
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Both TPO and Wingo have certain constraining effects on the
office of United States Magistrate. However, they both deal with
particular matters and, when properly limited to their facts, need
not prevent the courts from further liberalizing their utilization of
magistrates." For example, Campbell v. United States District
Court0 presented the question of whether a magistrate could recom-
mend findings of fact and conclusions of law on a motion to suppress
evidence. The Ninth Circuit decided that Wingo's application
should be limited to habeas corpus petitions and that the case had
no relevance to a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence.3' The
court further held that Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure controls proceedings on motions to suppress evidence and
does not require that the district court itself conduct the hearing.2
The Second Circuit, relying on the "additional duties" rubric of
Section 636(b),3 3 has approved the use of magistrates to recommend
whether a motion to dismiss 4 or a motion for summary judgment 35
should be granted. In Dewrell v. Weinberger,36 the Fifth Circuit
affirmed a district court's ruling that considered recommendations
of a magistrate concerning whether a claimant had been denied due
process in her disability hearing and whether the decision of the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to deny her claim was
supported by substantial evidence. 37
Although in each of the above cases the courts approved various
magisterial powers, these powers only involved the making of pro-
29. See Campbell v. United States Dist. Ct., 501 F.2d 196, 205 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974). See also text accompanying notes 33-43 infra.
30. 501 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974).
31. Id. at 202.
32. Id. at 204. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12 provides in part: "All other issues of fact shall be
determined by the court with or without a jury or on affidavits or in such other manner as
the court may direct."
33. See text accompanying notes 8-12 supra.
34. Givens v. W.T. Grant Co., 457 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1972). "The record in this case reflects
a commendable utilization . . . of the services of the full-time United States Magistrate...
in conformity with the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1970) . Id. at 613
n. 1.
35. Remington Arms Co. v. United States, 461 F.2d 1268 (2d Cir. 1972).
36. 478 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1973).
37. Ingram v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 1268 (6th Cir. 1972) also deals with a review of the
Secretary's decision on a disability claim, but the reference was for disposition. Because a
magistrate cannot make a decision on this question, the reference was held improper. Id. at
1270-71.
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posals, recommendations, or reports to the district court. In fact,
Campbell specifically mentioned that the magistrate who conducts
a hearing on a motion to suppress may not exercise ultimate deci-
sion making power. 8 According to Campbell, there is no abdication
by the district court of its judicial function in these cases as there
was in the case of La Buy v. Howell where the trial of an entire,
complicated case was referred to a master,40 and in TPO where the
reference to the magistrate was for the purpose of a decision.,' Thus,
magistrates may hold evidentiary hearings on issues other than fed-
eral habeas corpus petitions, and may make proposed findings of
fact, conclusions of law and a proposed order in certain circumstan-
ces.42 However the district court must make the final adjudication.43
III. The Effect of a Consensual Reference
Another question concerning the scope of a magistrate's power is
whether matters which would not otherwise be assignable to a mag-
istrate may be properly referred if both parties consent.4 A major
argument in favor of such reference is that the Magistrates Act
invests the magistrate with authority to conduct trials" for certain
38. 501 F.2d at 205. See also O'Shea v. United States, 491 F.2d 774 (1st Cir. 1974). In
O'Shea, involving a reference of a habeas corpus application, the First Circuit recognized that
the magistrate decides nothing but merely recommends. Id. at 776. O'Shea was later over-
ruled in part by Wingo where the Supreme Court disagreed with O'Shea's suggestion that
magistrates could hear oral testimony in a federal habeas corpus case provided that the
parties would have the right to a de novo hearing before the district judge. 418 U.S. at 473
n.19.
The First Circuit had previously proscribed any acceptance of final decision making by a
magistrate, calling it an abnegation of judicial authority. See Reed v. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 459 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1972); Rainha v. Cassidy, 454 F.2d 207 (1st Cir. 1972).
39. 352 U.S. 249 (1957): La Buy involved an attempted reference to special masters of all
the issues of a complicated antitrust trial despite the fact that the district court judge had
been involved in extensive pretrial proceedings. The Court held that a congested calendar
and the presence of complex issues are not sufficient justification for reference to a master.
Rather, it said, reference in such a case would be an abdication of the decision making
responsibility of the district courts. Id. at 256-59.
40. 501 F.2d at 205.
41. Id.
42. Campbell v. United States Dist. Ct., 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974); see Wingo v.
Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 470-71 n.ll (1974).
43. TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348, 359 (7th Cir. 1972). For approval of references
respecting all types of pretrial motions to magistrates so long as their role remains advisory,
see Doyle, supra note 21, at 67, 69.
44. United States v. Eastmount Shipping Corp., 62 F.R.D. 437, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a): "Each United States magistrate serving under this chapter shall
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petty criminal offenses so long as the defendant has consented. 6
Noting this, the court in United States v. Eastmount Shipping
Corp." approved the practice of referring cases involving relatively
small amounts of money to magistrates with consent."
The problem involving consensual references is often presented
when referring matters to a magistrate as a special master under 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).11 This section requires that such a reference be
made pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," particu-
larly the Rule 53(b) requirement that references to special masters
be made only upon a finding of exceptional circumstances.'
The legislature and the courts have said that Rule 53(b) embodies
the rule announced by the Supreme Court in La Buy to protect
against abdication of decision making by district courts.52 Neverthe-
less, many courts have approved consensual references to special
masters or other referees (before and after Rule 53 and the Magis-
trates Act) in other than exceptional circumstances, arguing that
the parties have the right to make this decision. On the other hand
some courts have insisted upon following the stricter test espoused
in La Buy and Rule 53(b) regardless of any consent by the parties.54
have . . . (3) the power to conduct trials under § 3401, title 18, United States Code, in
conformity with and subject to the limitations of that section."
46. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(3) (1970) incorporates the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (b) which
includes the requirement of the defendant's consent to a trial before a magistrate. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3401(f) provides: "As used in this section, the term 'minor offenses' means misdemeanors
punishable under the laws of the United States, the penalty for which does not exceed
imprisonment for a period of one year, or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both ....
47. 62 F.R.D. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
48. Id. at 439.
49. See note 8 supra.
50. 62 F.R.D. at 439.
51. See note 10 supra.
52. TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348, 357 (7th Cir. 1972). The court said: "These
conditions, which in essence reflect the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in La Buy v.
Howes Leather Company, 352 U.S. 249 (1957), protect against any abdication of the decision-
making responsibility that is properly that of the district courts." Id., citing S. REP. No. 371,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-27. For a discussion of special masters and Rule 53, see Kaufman,
Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 COL. L. REV. 452 (1958).
53. See Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512 (1889); Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U.S. 581 (1878);
Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. 123 (1864); De Costa v. CBS, Inc., 520 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1975);
Hart v. Williams, 202 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1952); United States v. Eastmount Shipping Corp.,
62 F.R.D. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
54. See Wilver v. Fisher, 387 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1967); Bartlett-Collins Co. v. Surinam
Navigation Co., 381 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1967); Cademartori v. Marine Midland Trust Co.,
18 F.R.D. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). It has been concluded that "[tihe court may also refuse to
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A recent judicial analysis of the propriety of consensual reference
to a magistrate where such a reference would not otherwise be per-
mitted appears in De Costa v. CBS, Inc.," involving a purported
consensual reference to a magistrate for findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law in a trademark or service mark infringement and unfair
competition case.
In De Costa, the First Circuit found the consensual reference to
be proper under both the Constitution and the Magistrates Act.56
The court held that the parties to a civil dispute may constitution-
ally select another forum; in this case, a magistrate." In a consen-
sual reference, the court continued, an Article III district judge is
not investing the magistrate with decision making authority.
Rather, it is the parties themselves who are selecting another arbiter
for their dispute. The De Costa court felt that they may do so,
absent overriding constitutional considerations. 8
Comparing the situation in its case to that in several old Supreme
Court cases59 in which references to arbitrators were approved, the
De Costa court said that both situations involved a knowing waiver
of access to an Article III judge in favor of another forum, and
refer a matter though both parties have consented to the reference." C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2603 (1971).
55. 520 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1975). Consensual reference to a magistrate for decision raises
a constitutional question involving the requirement that the judicial power of the United
States be exercised only by Article III court judges. See note 19 supra. While the parties may
have the right to waive their right to a trial by an Article III judge, see text accompanying
note 67 infra, the respective powers of the district court and the magistrate is a question of
subject matter jurisdiction. Since subject matter jurisdiction cannot be created or waived by
the parties, the constitutional question remains unresolved.
56. 520 F.2d at 507-08. "It therefore seems clear to us that the Congressional intent was
to leave untouched the tradition, as Congress understood it, that parties could, without
violation of Article III freely consent to refer cases to non-Article Ill officials for decisions."
Id. at 507. The district court's analysis of the case stated that the consensual reference to a
magistrate was not a reference to a special master under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), but was
governed by the "additional duties" language of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). It concluded that adjudi-
cation of a civil case by a magistrate based on the parties' consent was constitutionally and
statutorily permissible. 383 F. Supp. at 336-37. The court of appeals, on the other hand, never
clearly defined which part of the Act contrblled this consensual reference. It did indicate,
however, that it would not limit consensual references to "some exceptional conditions" as
required by FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b) for references to special masters. 520 F.2d at 507.
57. 520 F.2d at 503-04.
58. Id.
59. Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512 (1889); Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U.S. 581 (1878);
Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. 123 (1864).
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concluded that both were constitutional."0 La Buy was distinguished
on its facts. Unlike De Costa, it involved judicial references of com-
plicated issues over the parties' objections to private masters in
order to clear crowded dockets."'
The De Costa decision also suggested, through an examination of
the legislative history of the Magistrates Act, that there was no
statutory impediment to a consensual reference.2 In so deciding, the
court cited a Senate subcommittee staff memorandum accompany-
ing the draft of the legislation. That memorandum, in discussing
the Magistrates Act, stated: 4
The use of magistrates for duties that do not require the employment of an
Article III judge, or in cases in which the parties consent to the use of a
magistrate, may do much to increase the efficiency of the Federal Courts.
The court further mentioned a memorandum by the Senate sub-
committee staff concerning the constitutionality of magistrates
trying minor offenses. 5 This memo stated that if there is any right
to trial by an Article III judge, it is a right which can be waived by
the consent of the defendant." A subsection in the same memoran-
dum also recognized that in ordinary practice parties can consent
to the delegation of judicial responsibility to a special master. 7
Finally, the opinion referred to the Senate Report which accompa-
nied the proposed legislation in the Senate. This Report, while
recognizing the statutory requirement 6 of following Rule 53(b), in-
60. 520 F.2d at 504-06. Arguing in favor of the constitutionality of a consensual reference
to a magistrate, the court points out: "The authority of the courts to relinquish their decision
making authority in favor of the arbitrators to the extent described in a private contract has
long been assumed to have passed constitutional muster." Id. at 505. (citations omitted).
61. Id. See Comment, An Adjudicative Role for Federal Magistrates in Civil Cases, 40 U.
CHI. L. REV. 584, 588, 592 (1973), which argues that the principle of La Buy does not reach
the federal magistrates and that magistrates should be awarded a larger role, especially if
the parties consent.
62. 520 F.2d at 506; see text accompanying notes 49-54 supra.
63. 520 F.2d at 506.
64. Hearings on S. 3475 and S. 945 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. & 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 14 (1967).
65. 520 F.2d at 507.
66. Hearings on S. 3475 and S. 945 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. & 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 256 (1967).
67. Id. at 253.
68. 520 F.2d at 507.
69. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(1970).
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corporates" a memorandum of the subcommittee staff which states
that a party can waive his right to trial by judge and/or jury by
consenting to a reference.7
The First Circuit concluded that a consensual reference of a case
to a magistrate is both constitutionally and statutorily permissible,
and is not limited by the "exceptional condition" language of Rule
53(b) .72 The key factor in De Costa was the consent of all the parties.
That consent persuaded the First Circuit to conclude that the case
could be referred to a magistrate for initial decision.73 Thus, the rule
announced in De Costa represents a new line of reasoning concern-
ing consensual references, permitting even decision making by mag-
istrates if the parties have so consented. It clearly contradicts the
view of some commentators that the language in TPO, and its
progeny, restricts even consensual references to protect against "an
abdication of the judicial function."74
IV. The Scope of District Court Review
A corollary to the issue of the scope of a federal magistrate's power
is the question of the scope of review of that magistrate's actions by
the district court. The issues are related since the district court's
scope of review increases or decreases according to what powers the
magistrate has been given.
Absent the consent of the parties, the general rule is that a magis-
trate only may make recommendations, while the district court
judge must formulate the final decision.75 When the magistrate is
serving as a special master under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), review by
the district court is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
70. S. REP. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1967).
71. Hearings on S. 3475 and S. 945 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. & 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 281-83 (1967).
72. 520 F.2d at 507-08; see note 55 supra.
73. 520 F.2d at 507.
74. Comment, supra note 61, at 592. "This concept of constitutional restrictions [on a
court's ability to make consensual references] conflicts with long-standing approval in sev-
eral areas of the law of federal court enforcement of decisions by non-Article HI federal
tribunals when the parties had consented to the tribunal." Id. But, the Seventh Circuit in
TPO never discussed the relevancy of consent. Id. at 587; see text accompanying notes 16-
24, 32 supra. It is suggested that TPO should be limited to its facts; therefore its broad
language would not apply to a consensual reference.
75. See text accompanying notes 16-24, 38-42 supra.
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dure. 8 Where there is no stipulation that the master's findings of
fact are to be final, the court, in a non-jury action, must accept
those findings unless they are clearly erroneous.77
A finding of fact by the master is clearly erroneous when "the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."7 If the parties
stipulate that a master's findings of fact shall be final, then the
court will consider only questions of law arising upon the report."
Rule 53 contains no provision concerning the effect to be given a
master's conclusions of law. 0 As such, it is agreed that a master's
conclusions of law need carry no weight with the district court,
although they are entitled to careful consideration."
Application to the court for action upon the master's report and
any objections to the report must be by motion.2 The court must
hold a hearing on the motion." It then may adopt the report, modify
it, or reject it in whole or in part. It may choose to receive further
evidence or may recommit the report to the master with instruc-
tions. 4 The report is not automatically adopted if there are no objec-
tions. However, absent any specific objections, the court is likely to
76. See note 8 supra.
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2) which provides: "In Non-Jury Actions. In an action to be tried
without a jury the court shall accept the master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.
Within 10 days after being served with notice of the filing of the report any party may serve
written objections thereto upon the other parties. Application to the court for action upon
the report and upon objections thereto shall be by motion and upon notice as prescribed in
Rule 6(d). The court after hearing may adopt the report or may modify it or may reject it in
whole or in part or may receive further evidence or may recommit it with instructions."
78. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,395 (1948); see Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 308 F. Supp. 679, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); McGraw Edison Co. v.
Central Transformer Corp., 196 F. Supp. 664, 666-67 (E.D. Ark. 1961), aff'd, 308 F.2d 70 (8th
Cir. 1962).
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(4) provides: "Stipulation as to Findings. The effect of a master's
report is the same whether or not the parties have consented to the reference; but, when the
parties stipulate that a master's findings of fact shall be final, only questions of law arising
upon the report shall thereafter be considered." But see note 56 supra. De Costa, holding that
parties may agree to have a magistrate make the final decision, implies that consensual
references to a magistrate as a special master need not be limited by Rule 53. 520 F.2d at
507.
80. FED. R. Cv. P. 53.
81. See D.M.W. Contracting Co. v. Stolz, 158 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330
U.S. 839 (1947).
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2).
83. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2612 (1971).
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2).
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approve the findings of the master."5 The magistrate who is func-
tioning as a special master is always subject to review under these
procedures."8
When the magistrate is performing other duties, the district court
is not restricted to the review dictated by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 7 Recognizing this, the district court in American Honda
Motor Co. v. Vickers Motors, Inc.,88 a case involving the reference
of a discovery dispute to a magistrate, decided to follow its own
court rule and to conduct a hearing to review the magistrate's report
only if it deemed such a hearing necessary or desirable." Even in
the absence of a hearing, its review of the magistrate's reports and
recommendations would consist of a review of "all the record, infor-
mation and material essential for a proper adjudication ....
In another instance, while emphasizing that the district court
must make the final adjudication on a motion to suppress evidence,
the court in Campbell outlined the method of review that the dis-
trict court should follow to insure a proper final adjudication,
First, if neither party objects to the magistrate's proposed findings
of fact, the court may accept them as correct and proceed to decide
the motion on the applicable law.9 But, if either party so requests,
the district court will listen to the tape recording of the proceedings
before the magistrate and consider his proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law before making a de novo determination of the
facts and conclusions of law to be drawn from those facts.9 3
Furthermore, while the court may request and receive additional
evidence or call and hear the testimony of one or more witnesses, it
is not required to do so;9" nor is it required to hold a second hearing
85. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2612 (1971).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1970).
87. Id. § 636(b); see American Honda Motor Co. v. Vickers Motors, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 118,
120-21 (W.D. Tenn. 1974).
88. 64 F.R.D. 118 (W.D. Tenn. 1974).
89. Id. at 121. FED. R. Cv. P. 53(e)(2) would have required a hearing by the district court
upon objection by any party to the magistrate's report. See text accompanying notes 82-83
supra.
90. 64 F.R.D. at 121.
91. Campbell v. United States Dist. Ct., 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 879 (1974).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 206-07.
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of the case. 5 The Campbell decision concluded that the district
court could accept, reject, or modify the proposed findings of the
magistrate or might even enter new findings," as long as the district
court itself makes the final determination of the facts and the final
adjudication of the motion to suppress. 7
Each procedure for district court review of a magistrate's decision
discussed above has its own variations. However, there is one com-
mon element in each; that is the requirement of final decision mak-
ing by the district court itself. 8 Again, the possibility of a different
standard for a consensual reference is present. It has been suggested
in De Costa that a magistrate's ruling on both the facts and the law
might be subject to little or no review by the district court if the
parties' consent to the reference clearly gave the magistrate such
broad power.9 However, this particular question was never reached
in the case."'
The implications of such a suggestion are profound because once
it is accepted that a magistrate acting under a consensual reference
may properly perform even the decision making function if the par-
ties so agree, 0' the same reasoning can be applied in concluding that
the parties could legally agree to a lesser standard of district court
review. Indeed, allowing the magistrate to make the initial decision
necessarily involves a lower degree of district court review than is
generally invoked.102
There is some authority cited in De Costa to support this sugges-
tion. First, the court mentions language in an old reference case,
Kimberly v. Arms,"3 which limited district court review to the ques-
tion of "manifest error" in law or fact.'"4 There is also the arbitration
tradition and the Federal Arbitration Act, 05 under which the court
95. Id. at 207.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See text accompanying notes 74-97 supra.
99. 520 F.2d at 508.
100. Id.
101. See text accompanying notes 44-45, 54-73 supra.
102. See text accompanying note 99 supra.
103. 129 U.S. 512 (1889).
104. Id: at 524. The Court said that review would lie to correct "manifest error in the
consideration given to the evidence, or in the application of the law, but not otherwise." Id.
The De Costa court referred to this statement since it was the standard applied by the district
court, but expressed the opinion that the term lacked content. 520 F.2d at 508.
105. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970).
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must enter judgment upon the decision of the arbitrators unless
certain abuses are apparent; an arbitration award can be reversed
only on very limited grounds.'"6 Finally, it was provided in Equity
Rule 61 1/2,'"' from which Rule 53(e)(4) is derived,' 8 that when the
parties clearly so intend, the court may review the case only in the
manner it could review the decision of an arbitrator.'"9
It remains to be seen whether a court faced with an unequivocal
consent to a final determination by a magistrate will allow that
magistrate to be the decision maker with only appellate review or
very limited district court review. Its alternatives will be to dismiss
this possibility '" or wait for Congress to fashion a review procedure
for such consensual references."'
V. Conclusion
It has been suggested by a United States Magistrate that:"'
[Tihe office of U.S. Magistrate constitutes the most dynamic change in
federal procedure since the adoption of the civil rules, and the only signifi-
cant change in the structure of the federal judiciary in recent years. The office
of magistrate should not be regarded merely as a mini-district court, but a
truly distinct office, with possibilities of change and opportunities for growth
entirely its own.
106. Id. § 9 provides that judgment "shall be entered upon the award . . . unless the
award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 [of title 9] .. "
Under these sections an award can be vacated only when procured by fraud or corruption, or
for bias or misconduct on the part of the arbitrators. The district court may modify an award
only for material miscalculations or an assumption of jurisdiction not granted to the arbitra-
tor. Id. §§ 10-11.
107. 286 U.S. 571 (1932).
108. 5A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACnCE P. 53.12 [1] (2d ed. 1974).
109. Equity Rule 61 1/2 read in part: "[W]hen a case or any issue is referred by consent
and the intention is plainly expressed in the consent order that the submission is to the master
as an arbitrator, the court may review the same only in accordance with the principles
governing a review of an award and decision by an arbitrator." Equity R. 61 /2, 286 U.S. 571
(1932).
110. See De Costa v. CBS, Inc., 520 F.2d 499, 515 (1st Cir. 1975) (concurring opinion).
Judge Aldrich concluded: "I see no basis for suggesting that a magistrate should be in such
a unique position that he is less reviewable than anyone else in the judicial system, and I
regret that my brethren should be willing even to contemplate it." Id. at 516.
111. Id. at 508. The court said: "Until Congress, on reviewing the experience under the
Federal Magistrates Act, fashions a review procedure for consensual reference for final (or
semi-final) determination of all issues of law and fact, it might be better to rely on the
formulation contained in Rule 53(e)(4)." Id.
112. Sussman, The Fourth Tier in the Federal Judicial System: The United States
Magistrate, 56 Cm. B. REC. 134, 141 (1974).
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Since the Magistrates Act allows for the assignment of a magistrate
to duties "as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of
the United States","' there should be a bounty of responsibilities
which he could share with the district court judge."4 In view of the
temporal and financial economies of shifting more and more of the
district court's burden to the magistrate, the growth of the office of
magistrate should be encouraged.
Consensual references for decision would certainly broaden the
amount of assistance which a magistrate could render. However, the
constitutional question persists. On the one hand, the argument
would be that only an Article III court may hear Article III cases, a
proposition which runs to subject matter jurisdiction and so cannot
be affected by the consent of the parties. On the other hand, an
argument could be made that since the office of magistrate is within
the judicial framework, reference to a magistrate does not remove
the case from the purview of the Article Il district court. Another
argument in favor of constitutionality of consensual references to
magistrates for decision is the language of the Supreme Court in
Kimberly v. Arms,"5 a case involving a consensual reference to a
special master in 1889. The Court said:"'
[Wihen the parties consent to the reference of a case to a master or other
officer to hear and decide all the issues therein, and report his findings, both
of fact and of law, and such reference is entered as a rule of the court, the
master is clothed with very different powers from those which he exercises
upon ordinary references, without such consent; and his determinations are
not subject to be set aside and disregarded at the mere discretion of the court.
The decision on constitutionality must ultimately be made by the
Supreme Court. If other courts follow the lead of DeCosta, the ques-
tion will certainly be raised. If the Supreme Court determines that
consensual references for decision are constitutional, it would be
appropriate to establish procedural safeguards for the references
113. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1970).
114. It is suggested in In re Wainwright, 518 F.2d 173, 175 (1975), that it is probably
within the power of a magistrate to release a state prisoner on bail pending district court
hearing and decision on a writ of habeas corpus application. The court stated that: "There
is nothing to indicate that a magistrate's jurisdiction vis-a-vis bail is more limited than that
of the District Court which he serves." Id. at 175 n.1.
115. 129 U.S. 512 (1889).
116. Id. at 524.
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and for review of the magistrate's decision. This will insure that the
protections offered by Article III courts will still inure to the parties.
Eileen J McCabe

